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“Responsibility equals accountability equals ownership. And a sense of ownership 
is the most powerful weapon a team or organization can have.” 


























This thesis investigates the effects of ownership structure on firm risk in China. 
The first essay of this thesis provides an overview of the Chinese privatisation 
programmes that profoundly shapes the ownership structure of Chinese listed firms, and 
it reviews and discusses the corporate governance and firm outcomes resulting from the 
privatisation programmes in China. In particular, it presents a detailed survey of China’s 
privatisation programmes from its Share Issue Privatisation (SIP) to the Non-tradable 
Share (NTS) reform, Overall, it reveals that the SIP has achieved limited success in China, 
which is mainly due to the partial trading policy and partial privatisation characteristics, 
while the NTS reform yields greater improvements of governance mechanisms and 
outcomes. 
 
This thesis then, examines the impact of ownership structure on firm risk in 
privatised firms. Essay two examines the effect of residual state ownership on stock return 
volatility following the NTS reform. The empirical evidence shows that residual state 
ownership mitigates the stock return volatility. It indicates that state ownership retention 
in the aftermath of sudden privatisation reform can signal the government willingness to 
bear the firm risk. The mitigating effect is especially pronounced in firms controlled by 
the government agents. Furthermore, firms with higher government ownership reduce 
stock return volatility through implementing more conservative corporate policies. 
However, the volatility-mitigating effect appears to be temporary, lasting only for three 





Essay three investigates the relationship between the shareholdings of the 
Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) and stock price crash risk. This essay 
adopts a governance mechanism, threat of exit, to examine the role of QFIIs on stock 
price crash risk. The evidence shows that long investment horizon and existence of 
multiple QFIIs exert credible exit threat to discipline management, and in turn, reduce 
stock price crash risk. Further, it shows that the corporate site visits of portfolio firms by 
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